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FEDERAL SUPREMACY IN LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS
ROBERT C. KNEE*
IT WOULD seem that a discussion at this time on the subject of federal
supremacy or pre-emption in the elusive field of labor management
relations would be similar to a postlude to the last satisfying crescendo
of a delightful symphony. Since the Supreme Court of the United States
decided on March 25, 1957 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,1 Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,2 and San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon3 much has been said and written re-
garding these cases and their implications in the field of labor relations.4
In October of 1957, Senator Ives, who spoke before the Association of
State Labor Relation Agencies, stated: "[L]egislative approaches to-
wards the elimination of the jurisdictional 'no-man's land' created by
the Supreme Court decisions must receive Congressional consideration
next year."5 On January 23, 1958, the President of the United States
sent a labor message to Congress,6 in which an amendment was proposed,
authorizing the states to act with respect to matters over which the
National Labor Relations Board declined to assert jurisdiction, and to
eliminate the jurisdictional vacuum referred to in the three recent
Supreme Court decisions. On the same day that the President's message
was sent to Congress omnibus bills embodying the President's recom-
mendation were introduced before Congress. 7 Since the introduction of
these bills, and to the date of this writing, much has been officially said
but there has been no legislation to remedy the situation which the three
Supreme Court cases pointed up. At the same time, courts generally
have manifested a reluctance to follow the pathway hewn by the Supreme
* Member of the Ohio Bar. Mr. Knee was assisted in the preparation of this article
by Ray E. Schmidt, Member of the Ohio Bar.
1. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
2. 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
3. 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
4. See generally 45 Calif. L. Rev. 216 (1957); 26 Fordham L. Rev. 349 (1957); 56
Mich. L. Rev. 133 (1957); 43 Va. L. Rev. 133 (1957).
5. Daily Labor Rep. No. 203 (Oct. 17, 1957).
6. 104 Cong. Rec. 645 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1958).
7. S. 3097, S. 3098, S. 3099, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Since the writing of this
article, in the judiciary Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1878, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958), the majority of the Committee opined that its bill would "preclude the courts
from presuming a legislative intent to preempt the field," and that its bill as reported
favorably to the House (H.R. 3) would not allow such construction unless the Act
contained express provision to that effect, or unless there was a direct and positive conflict
between such act and the state so that the two could not be reconciled or consistently
stand together.
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Court; illustrative of court reaction are the cases of Johnson v. Grand
Rapids Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO8 and Elsis v. Evans.9
The subject of federal pre-emption had also received the attention of
writers in the field prior to the Guss case.' °
Manifestly, the question could logically be put, "What more can be
said on the subject that has not already been said?" The Supreme Court
cases have been ably analyzed, interpretations have been erudite and
criticism has been offered. It is submitted, however, that there is an
area of federal supremacy in which a reasonably fresh approach is
possible. This approach would be couched in some of the fundamental
concepts for the student and the practical and busy general practitioner
who must make his living in the profession midst a kaleidoscopic flow
of cases with ever-changing patterns in various fields of law. The ap-
proach would be concerned as little as possible with the current and
intricate controversies which have been kindled into flame by the recent
Supreme Court decisions. Little emphasis will be placed on the eternal
argument of federal supremacy, as that supremacy is opposed to the
area of states' rights. With these subjects as backgrounds, this article
will pragmatically approach the subject of federal pre-emption, showing
the interconnection of occurrences and decisions. There are those who
might suggest that the panoramic view which would be thus produced
would suffer for want of intricate detail. However that may be, the fact
remains that highly controversial legal issues which are infused with
intricacies need the benefit of a main-line approach so that the student
and lawyer may acquaint themselves with the basic principles of the
issues. Once this is done, there is time enough for dialectics and the
details of the issues.
BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY
The title, "Federal Supremacy in Labor Management Relations," is
designed to imply that if relief is sought in a labor dispute," and that
8. 40 L.R.R.M. 2616 (Cir. Ct. Mich. Sept. 7, 1957). "Congress has no power to deny
due process . . . in exercising its power in commerce." Id. at 2617.
9. 41 L.R.R.M. 2600 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Cal. Feb. 4, 1958). The court held that
the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction but declared there is "no moral or legal reason why,
in the event federal labor boards decline to accept jurisdiction in a given case, the state
courts should not be permitted to enforce a legislatively declared public policy, where
that policy is consistent with the federal policy in the field of labor relations." Id. at 2607.
10. See Feldblum, Jurisdictional "Tidelands" in Labor Relations, 3 Lab. L.J. 114, 116
(1952); NLRB Jurisdictional Standards and State Jurisdiction, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 190
(1955); Smith, The Taft Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 46
Mich. L. Rev. 593 (1948); Cooper, Extent of State Jurisdiction Due to Abnegation by
NLRB, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 58 (1956); Tobriener & Grodin, Taft-Hartley Pre-emption in
the Area of NLRB Inaction, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 663 (1956).




dispute is in commerce, the lawyer will inevitably find his pathway lead-
ing to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.' Before going into
jurisdiction as provided in the act itself with the current interpretative
decisions of the Supreme Court, the background will be discussed very
briefly.
The doctrine of federal pre-emption, of course, stems from the Consti-
tution of the United States.' 3 The issue of supremacy under the consti-
tutional provisions has long occupied the courts in an ever-changing and
developing economy in America. Changes and developments are still
with us, as witness the controversy which is the subject of this article.
And, those changes and developments will still be with us within the fore-
seeable future as the courts and Congress attempt to keep abreast of
our restless economy.
The industrial revolution in America actually marked the beginning
of an interdependent economy and the attendant inability of the several
states to cope with the mounting social and economic problems which
gradually spread beyond state lines into regional and national areas.
Hence, the states, through their laws, became increasingly impotent to
contain or control these problems. It was because of the failure of the
states successfully to control an expanding economy through local laws
that the notion of federal supremacy took hold on the theory that only
the federal government could deal with issues that were gradually affect-
ing the nation.
As a direct result of the growth of the economy into a restless, sprawl-
ing giant, the Interstate Commerce Act 4 began its laborious career as
a law in 1887. Under this law, the Interstate Commerce Commission
was the first permanent administrativb board to which was delegated
broad and multiple powers, quasi-judicial and legislative. The establish-
ment of this board was, of course, an innovation, but it presaged the
inexorable surge of pre-emption in America.
Liberalism took on a new meaning under Theodore Roosevelt and
constitutional issues became increasingly important, especially in the
field of interstate commerce and taxation. Conservative sources took
the position that the Constitution of the United States was an inflexible
12. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power . . . [3] to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. . . . [18] To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers...";
art. VI, [2] (The so-called supremacy clause), "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
14. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
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document and could not be changed except by amendment, and most
certainly not by judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court through
change of personnel gradually became more liberal and less "property
minded" in constitutional interpretation following the turn of the cen-
tury. Federal pre-emption reached a peak during the era of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal. During this period the National
Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional, but from its
unconstitutional ashes emerged the nation's first full-fledged Labor Re-
lations Act.15 Known as the Wagner Act, it set up the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), a board with quasi-judicial powers to admin-
ister the law. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 became
law and replaced its narrower predecessor, the Wagner Act. This act,
its short title being the Taft Hartley Act, is one of the most comprehen-
sive pieces of regulatory legislation ever to control a given economic
field. It goes without saying that in this era, regulatory legislation, both
economic and social, has been declared constitutional. Great strides have
been made in the field of federal pre-emption via liberal judicial reviews
of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY
The NLRB has been granted plenary jurisdiction over labor relations
in matters "affecting commerce." Section 10(a) of the amended act is
the so-called "cession clause"' 6 under which the NLRB may cede juris-
diction to a state court in any case where the Board declines to exercise
its jurisdiction. To the date of this writing we know of no cession agree-
ment granted by the NLRB under section 10(a) to the agency of any
state. Under the power granted the NLRB which is buttressed by con-
stitutional provisions regarding interstate commerce, all employers whose
operations "affect" interstate commerce are covered by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The power to act by the NLRB is
present, and in light of recent holdings it is not now imaginative to con-
clude that the power would exclude the intervention of any state or its
agency in the area of commerce within the field of labor management
relations. Hence, if a labor dispute affects commerce nothing else is really
15. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
16. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952). The proviso to section 10(a)
reads as follows: "Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency
of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
(other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where
predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes
affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to
the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding
provision of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith."
[Vol. 27
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needed to give the NLRB jurisdiction. However, the power to act in
matters "affecting commerce" is one thing, and the exercising of that
power is another. The NLRB has never exercised its full power. More-
over, the recent Supreme Court decisions point up with obvious clarity
that neither congressional nor constitutional intent shall be overridden
by the states, their agencies or courts, even though the NLRB has not
accepted or has declined to accept jurisdiction. Indeed, in an early case
the Supreme Court took the view that in light of the congressional
intent, the NLRB's power would stretch to the entire circumference of
the commerce clause.'
The reason given by the Board for the failure to exercise its full
authority was, in the main, budgetary. From the Wagner Act in 1935
until 1950 a case by case approach to jurisdiction was made by the
Board. A favorite expression, adopted to decline jurisdiction, was "we
decline jurisdiction because to accept would not effectuate the purposes
of the Act." This case by case method was, of course, qualified by the
frequent application of the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex. In
other words, the Board also acknowledged jurisdictional declination on
the theory that the law does not bother with trifles.
In the year 1950 the Board, for the first time, set out specific stand-
ards by which jurisdiction would be accepted.'" In the adoption of these
standards, the Board followed the dollar-volume approach to jurisdic-
tion. However, an analysis of these standards will reveal that the Board
neither lowered nor raised its sights; it merely substituted the slide rule,
dollar-volume formula for the case by case approach.
In the year 1954, marked changes were made by the Board in its
yardstick standards.'" By virtue of a number of decisions handed
down by the Board subsequent to the adoption of these 1954 standards,
jurisdiction was declined in operations which had been theretofore
accepted under earlier standards. This was accomplished by the
relatively simple expedient of the revision upward of the former
dollar-volume standards, and, in at least six other strategic areas a
different revenue formula was exerted where theretofore full and com-
plete jurisdiction was exercised. 20 Thus, in its jurisdiction, the NLRB
both restricted and withdrew its authority from important areas of our
economy, leaving "blind spots" upon the horizon. These blind spots
eventually became a desert which has been universally referred to as((no man's land." The unilateral adoption by the NLRB of jurisdic-
17. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1939). The Supreme Court in the Guss
case reaffirmed the Fainblatt ruling.
18. 1 CCII Lab. L. Rep. (4th ed.) if 1610 (1950).
19. 1 CCtI Lab. L. Rep. (4th ed.) if 1610 (1954).
20. See note 19 supra. But see note 49 infra.
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tional standards or yardsticks which fall short of the reach of the author-
ity granted the Board by Congress is the basis for the present legal
dilemma.
This declination of jurisdiction poses the question, what happens to
these barren areas, that is to say, these areas wherein the NLRB refuses
jurisdiction and yet makes no cession agreements under section 10(a)
of the act? Do the states, or their agencies or courts have the right to
assume jursdiction? It remained for the Supreme Court to answer this
question which it did with unquestioned clarity in the Guss case. A dis-
cussion of the holding of this case should be prefaced with a review of
important and guidepost cases which cut the pathway for Guss and its
companion cases and which presaged the current legal status of federal
pre-emption.
THE CURRENT DEVELOPING LAW
The mainline cases regarding the superiority of the federal over state
law21 paved the way for the now famous case of Garner v. Teamsters
Union, AFL,22 which started the current legal ball rolling in federal
versus state jurisdiction in the labor management relations field. The
facts in that case were:
Petitioners were engaged in the trucking business and had twenty-four employees,
four of whom were members of respondent union. The trucking operations formed
a link to an interstate railroad. No controversy, labor dispute or strike was in
progress, and at no time had petitioners objected to their employees joining the
union. Respondents, however, placed rotating pickets, two at a time, at petitioners'
loading platform. None were employees of petitioners. . . . Picketing was orderly
and peaceful, but drivers for other carriers refused to cross this picket line and, as
most of petitioners' interchange of freight was with unionized concerns, their business
fell off as much as 95%. The courts below found that respondents' purpose in
picketing was to coerce petitioners into compelling or influencing their employees
to join the union.23
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' grievance fell within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair
labor practices. State remedies were precluded. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining
peaceful picketing by the union in an effort to coerce the employer into
compelling employees to join the union. It should be noted that since
21. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.,
330 U.S. 767 (1947); LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 18 (1949); Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338
U.S. 953 (1950); International Union of United Automobile Workers, CIO v. O'Brien,
339 U.S. 454 (1950).
22. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
23. Id. at 486-87.
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there was no congressional intent indicating that federal and state juris-
diction was concurrent, the Supreme Court upheld the doctrine of pre-
emption. It should further be noted that in the Garner case there was a
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act involved.
24
There is no doubt that the Garner case became a milestone in the
laborious ascent of the doctrine of federal pre-emption, and a formidable
number of the bench and bar so considered it. Many of the profession,
however, took the position that the holding in the case would not have
been so sweepingly in favor of pre-emption had a state statute- totally
unrelated to labor been involved. In other words, it was thought that if
such an unrelated state statute had been violated, the Supreme Court
would not have been so willing to apply the doctrine of federal pre-
emption over state law. These legal daydreams were dissipated in a
bilateral fashion when Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.25 was decided
by the Supreme Court in 1955.
The Weber case goes much further than Garner in its application of
the pre-emption doctrine. It involved a strike and picketing regarding a
contract clause in a collective bargaining agreement. This clause pre-
cipitated a jurisdictional dispute between the Carpenters' Union and the
International Association of Machinists. The Missouri Supreme Court
held that the IAM's conduct constituted a violation of the state's restraint
of trade statute, and because of this the action was enjoinable. The
United States Supreme Court considered the principal issue in the case to
be "whether the state court had jurisdiction to enjoin the IAM's conduct
or whether its jurisdiction had been pre-empted by the authority vested
in the National Labor Relations Board... ." The Court held:
[W]here the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts
reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and
where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed
to come within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline
jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for determining
such issues in the first instance.2 7
In two important approaches to the issues in Weber the Supreme
Court of the United States broadened the doctrine of pre-emption. First,
the Court said that if the activity complained of is not an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of a certain section of the act28 then the
state would still be precluded from exerting jurisdiction over the issues
because the acts complained of could very well be concerted activity
24. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 211.6 (1952).
25. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
26. Id. at 473.
27. Id. at 481.
28. Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
19581
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and protected by section 7 of the act.29 The distinction between the
unfair labor practice sections and section 7 of the act should not be
minimized. Each covers different phases of activity. The unfair labor
practice sections have to do with violations whereas section 7 grants
immunity to concerted and other legal activities, which activities the
unfair labor practice sections of the act protect. When this distinction
is made it becomes clear that the reach of the pre-emption doctrine was
extended beyond the holding in Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL. This
extension covers all protected activity involving a labor dispute in com-
merce.3" In other words, Weber is authority for the proposition that it
is not necessary that the acts complained of be violations as a condition
precedent to the exclusion of state authority.
Now the second approach by the Supreme Court in the Weber case
also reaches beyond the holding in Garner. In the latter case a state
labor statute was involved. In the Weber case the state anti-trust law
of Missouri was alleged to have been involved, and the alleged violation
of this state statute was enjoined by the Missouri court as previously
stated. This statute was totally foreign to the field of labor management
relations. The holding of the Supreme Court in Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. regarding violation of the state anti-trust statute simply
means this: if there is a labor dispute and that dispute is in commerce,
and if the dispute might involve concerted activity as protected by sec-
tion 7 of the act, the states are precluded from assuming jurisdiction
over the issues, even though the acts complained of are in violation of
a state statute which is totally unrelated to labor management relations.
The two cases discussed substantially provided a rather complete pat-
tern in which the ascendency of federal supremacy over state authority
in commerce in the matter of labor disputes became obvious. There was,
however, one question which remained unanswered. What would be the
situation in the restricted and abandoned areas in which the NLRB had
refused to act or declined jurisdiction, even though the Board had juris-
29. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952) provides: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organ-
ization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title."
30. 61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1952) defines a "labor dispute" as follows:
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,




diction? Would the several states have the authority to assume juris-
diction in these areas? The answer to this question would seem clear
in the cold light of the prevailing holdings in Garner and Weber. It
would appear from these two decisions that the Supreme Court was
moving counterclockwise to the Board. By this is meant the Court
was favoring federal control and pre-emption while the Board was shy-
ing away from it. Thus, the decisions in Garner and Weber lead directly
to the recent Supreme Court holdings.
THE RECENT HOLDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Despite the fact that the recent Supreme Court cases, particularly
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., have been analyzed, interpreted and
explained by able writers, it would be useful to restate the real signifi-
cance of the Guss case. The Supreme Court at bottom recognized the
power granted to the NRLB, and since the Board has seen fit not to
exercise this power to its fullest extent, no other tribunal or agency could
or should assume jurisdiction. As a direct result of this significant hold-
ing at the date of this writing, the now famous "no man's land" principle
stands as the law. The decision in that case brought forth a torrent of
words, both oral and written. Some were dialectic and erudite, and
others were just plain criticism. We cannot concur with the critics of
Guss. Our reason is that we believe in view of previous decisions by
the Supreme Court the result in Guss was unsavory but inevitable. If
the NLRB had jurisdiction, as it did, and it did not exercise it to the
fullest extent, as it did not, the Court in Guss could say but one thing,
"Here is a 'no man's land.' All we can do is point this out. Some other
-source must act."
We shall briefly consider Guss and the companion cases.
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.3'
Guss was a manufacturer of photographic equipment. The United
Steelworkers of America were certified as the bargaining representative
of Guss' employees. The union filed with the Board charges that Guss
had engaged in unfair labor practices. Due to the revised jurisdictional
standards, the Board declined jurisdiction. The union filed substantially
the same charges with the Utah Labor Relations Board, pursuant to the
Utah Labor Relations Act. The state Board found it had jurisdiction,
and concluded on the merits that Guss had engaged in unfair labor
practices. The case went before the United States Supreme Court which
reversed, holding that a state agency cannot exert its jurisdiction in an
area wherein the NLRB has declined to act, even though it has the
31. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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authority to do so; the only way a state agency could act would be by
the activation of the cession procedures set forth in section 10(a) of
the act. In other words, unless the NLRB actually ceded its authority,
and even though the Board declined jurisdiction, the doctrine of federal
supremacy in the field of labor management relations was paramount.
This, in a nutshell, is the "no man's land" holding.
The Supreme Court specifically recognized the vacuum plus the fact
that potential litigants would have no tribunal to which they could go
or appeal.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.3 2
Here, a retail meat market in Ohio was picketed for organizational
purposes. Although the business of the market was local in character,
wholesale purchases were made through interstate channels of commerce.
The act of picketing was the basis for the complaint, and an action
for an injunction was brought in the state courts. The state courts
assumed jurisdiction of the issues and enjoined the picketing. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The high points of the holding are
important.
The Taft Hartley Act contains a section which defines the expression
"affecting commerce."" The Court took the position that this section
was controlling and made it clear that if the issues were under the
"affecting commerce" definition, nothing else, not even the jurisdictional
yardsticks, is needed to give the NLRB jurisdiction. Hence, the inter-
state purchases by the local market were considered as "affecting com-
merce."
Unlike Utah in the Guss case, Ohio does not have a state labor rela-
tions act. This situation becomes important because the Supreme Court
held in Fairlawn that the proviso of section 10(a) of the act operated
to exclude not only state labor boards from disputes within the national
Board's jurisdiction, but also state courts from so doing. In other words,
the jurisdictional standards of the NLRB, which both restrict and aban-
don jurisdiction, do not remove the Board's authority to act, and, since
the authority is there, even though not exercised, Fairlawn is authority
for the proposition that state courts are placed in the same category as
state agencies as far as the provisions of section 10(a) of the act are
concerned.
32. 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
33. "The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." 61 Stat. 138
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1952).
[Vol. 2 7
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San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon84
This case, which was also a companion case to Guss, is just a little
more of the same thing. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Guss
and Fairlawn were, of course, direct authorities for the holding in
Garmon. There was, however, another important facet in the Garmon
case which requires discussion. Respondents, a partnership operating
two retail lumber yards, were picketed by the San Diego Trades Council
for a union contract. They filed charges with the NLRB under section'
8(a) (3) of the act. 5 Jurisdiction was declined on the basis of the 1954
dollar-volume standards. Respondents then filed suit in a state court of
California, seeking an injunction as well as damages. The state court,
believing it had jurisdiction after the NLRB's declination, granted the in-
junction and awarded damages.8 6 Of course, it goes without saying that,
under Guss and Fairlawn the state court was without jurisdiction to
grant the injunction, but it is the damage phase which requires brief
discussion. Because of state judicial affirmance, Garmon went to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court disposed of the state court injunc-
tion by reversal on the authority of Guss and Fairlawn. The damage
phase of the case was more troublesome. In United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp.87 a state court was granted the right to take
jurisdiction in a damage action involving a labor dispute when a tort
was committed under state law. Notwithstanding the federal supremacy
theory, it was held by the Supreme Court that a state could do this when
a state law was involved because the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 did not contain provisions regarding torts, which were violations
of state laws.
The reasoning in the Laburnum case was urged by the respondents
in Garmon to sustain the damage award. The Supreme Court, however,
distinguished Laburnum on the basis that there an award of damages
was sustained because the conduct complained of was a.violation of state
tort law, whereas in Garmon the state court relied upon a federal statute
(NLRA) to justify the damage award. The damage cause was remanded
to the California state court. The Supreme Court said that in doing this
they did not overrule the Laburnum doctrine; on the contrary, it still
stood, but Garmon did not qualify for the reasons above stated. This by
no means is a final answer to the problems arising when a state court
decides to award damages for an act that may be an unfair labor
practice.
34. 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
35. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
36. 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955).
37. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
1958]
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AREAS IN WHICH STATE COURT DAMAGE AwARDs ARE SUSTAINED
There are areas within the field of labor management relations wherein
state courts have jurisdiction over damage actions even though the acts
giving rise to the damages constitute an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA.
In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., discussed
previously in connection with the Garmon case, while the plaintiff was
performing construction work in Kentucky, agents of the defendant labor
unions demanded that plaintiff's employees join one of the defendant
unions. Upon the refusal of plaintiff, and many of its employees, the
defendants' agents threatened plaintiff and its employees with violence.
Plaintiff was compelled to abandon all of its projects in that area. Plain-
tiff then sued in the state court for damages and obtained a judgment
for a substantial amount. Upon the assumption that their conduct con-
stituted an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, contentions were made
that state courts were excluded from entertaining common-law tort
actions for the recovery of damages caused by such conduct. The Su-
preme Court rejected this contention."
The next and more recent matter decided by the Supreme Court was
the case of United Auto Workers v. Russell.39 In this case Russell was
a maintenance electrician who worked on an hourly basis for his em-
ployer who was struck by the union; the union was the bargaining agent
for certain employees. Russell was not a member of the striking union,
nor had he applied for membership. Russell attempted to go through
the picket line but was prevented from so doing. It appears that Russell
was not physically touched, struck or beaten. Because of his failure to
get into the plant he lost time, and, of course, wages. Russell then
filed suit in the state court and was awarded both compensatory and
punitive damages. The Supreme Court relied on the Laburnum case as
the controlling precedent. Indeed, the Court said that the cases were
similar in many respects. This may be true, but the decision in Russell,
in our opinion, goes much further than Laburnum. In Laburnum it was
the employer who sued in tort. When an employer sues a union, eye-
brows are not necessarily raised. It is the same as when "dog bites man."
In Russell it was an employee who was prevented from working and who
sued in tort. This is the same as when "man bites dog." The decision in
Russell is important, even beyond Laburnum, in that the Supreme Court
38. "The question before us is whether the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, has
given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a common-law tort action for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court
from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor
practice under that Act. . . . (W)e hold that it has not." 347 U.S. at 657.
39. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
[Vol. 27
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
places its jurisdictional stamp of approval on a damage suit by an indi-
vidual against a union in the give and take realism of a picket line, which,
at its legal best, is not a "pink tea party." Russell was prevented from
crossing the picket line not by physical force or conduct, but by force of
numbers on the picket line. Wholly apart from the common-law tort
theory, practically speaking, the Russell case poses a real threat to
unions. One of the essential purposes, frankly speaking, of the picket line
is to keep hourly-rated persons out of the plant. It is obvious that the de-
cision by the Supreme Court makes this purpose a dangerous one to
pursue.
Would the result have been the same had Russell been a member of
the bargaining unit? We believe that it would, because being a member
of the bargaining unit would not change the gravamen of the tort ap-
proach. However, would the result have been the same had Russell been
a member of the striking union but not necessarily a member of the
bargaining unit? We still believe, substantively speaking, it would have
been the same, but it is not necessary here to pass upon various state
statutes and the common law pertaining to actions against unincor-
porated associations nor the various state statutes which could quite
possibly create the paradox of an individual bringing an action against
himself, in light of the fact that the complainant then would be a member
of an unincorporated body which he sues.
Another extension beyond Laburnum by the very nature of the facts
is that Russell was not required to submit his case to the NLRB for
back pay under Section 10(c) of the NLRA.4 ° The Court held:
The power to order affirmative relief under § 10(c-) is merely incidental to the
primary purpose of Congress to stop and to prevent unfair labor practices. Con-
gress did not establish a general scheme authorizing the Board to award full com-
pensatory damages for injuries caused by wrongful conduct. 4 '
STATE JURISDICTION OVER VIOLENT UNION CONDUCT
At the present writing there is another area in which a state may
enjoin, or a state agency may cause a cease and desist order to issue
with reference to conduct which violates the NLRA, and where the con-
duct complained of could be said to be within the confines of the pre-
emption doctrine.
In UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.42 the issue was
whether a state had power to enjoin violent union conduct when the
NLRA empowered the NLRB to enjoin, among other unfair labor prac-
tices, coercion of employees who wish to refrain from striking. The
majority of the Court held that the pertinent unfair labor practice pro-
40. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
41. 356 U.S. at 642-43.
42. 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
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visions of the NLRA were not the exclusive method of controlling union
violence, even against employees who desired to work, much less violence
interfering with others approaching an area where a strike was in prog-
ress. The Court stated:
As a general matter we have held that a State may not, in the furtherance of its
public policy, enjoin conduct "which has been made an 'unfair labor practice' under
the federal statutes." (The Court cites Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S.
468 at 475). . . . But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions have made it clear that this
general rule does not take from the States power to prevent mass picketing, violence,
and overt threats of violence. The dominant interest of the State in preventing
violence and property damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter of genuine local
concern. Nor should the fact that a union commits a federal unfair labor practice
while engaging in violent conduct prevent states from taking steps to stop the
violence.43
It is suggested that there is a major similarity between the instant
case and United Auto Workers v. Russell. In Russell, of course, the
action was for damages, both compensatory and punitive, to an indi-
vidual. In UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. the remedy
was injunction against the union. In both cases, however, there was
violence, intimidation and coercive conduct through mass picketing. In
this state of fact lies the similarity. In other words, in instances involv-
ing such conduct, state courts now have the right to apply a remedy,
injunction, damages, or both. It is further important to note that the
Supreme Court of the United States revived its pronouncements that
"all" picketing should not be enjoined where a pattern of violence was
not so enmeshed in the picketing.4 It is further suggested that in the
light of the current holdings in Russell and UAW, the area alluded to
above would seem to be the only one in which a state court could extend
its jurisdiction concurrently with the NLRB.
CONCLUSION
The labor management relations field has been pre-empted by federal
law to the exclusion of state authority if the dispute is within the field
of commerce. If the dispute is within the field, and the factual pattern
of the issues affects commerce within the meaning of the definition here-
tofore cited, the states, their courts and agencies are excluded from
acting, even though the NLRB has not acted or has refused to act. It
should be noted that in the Fairlawn case, the Supreme Court gave to
the "affecting commerce" definition a broad and inclusive connotation.
In our opinion, this would be true, even to the exclusion of the Board's
jurisdictional yardsticks.
The power given the NLRB is broad and plenary, and if the NTLRB
does not accept jurisdiction, the litigant finds (at least currently) the
43. Id. at 274.
44. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1958).
[Vol. 27
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
doors of other tribunals, whether boards or courts, closed to him. There
is only one way whereby state labor boards or courts can exercise juris-
diction in the pre-empted field, and that is when the NLRB cedes juris-
diction to specific state boards or agencies under the proviso of section
10(a) to the act. There have been no such cession agreements.
Are there any exceptions, or better still, qualifications even if the
dispute is in commerce? The answer is "yes." Tortious conduct of
unions involving state laws, violence or unlawful picketing, coercion, or
intimidation would give rise to state court or state jurisdiction on three
fronts. First a state court could award damages to an individual who
alleges a cause of action based upon tortious conduct violating a state
law. The damage award could be both compensatory and punitive.
Secondly, state court or agency injunctive action may be had against
the union, based upon the same type of conduct. Lastly, a union member
may sue for damages in a state court because of his alleged wrongful
expulsion from a union, assuming action would be based upon the breach
of contract theory. This the member can do notwithstanding the fact
that the union's conduct in the expulsion procedure might be construed
to be an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.45 The damage award
in this type of case could be both compensatory and punitive.
There is no question that the current status of authority has made
exceedingly clear the dilemma in the labor management relations field.
The Supreme Court only pointed out the existing "vacuum" in juris-
diction. It did not create it. For whatever cause, budgetary or other-
wise, if responsibility must be fixed for the dilemma, the NLRB should
bear its fair share. The NLRB, of course, claims that it curtailed juris-
diction because of budgetary necessities. However this may be, all in-
formed sources will agree that the current situation cannot remain as
it is. The question is, what is the feasible course to pursue? There is
no ready answer to this. Chief Justice Warren said in the Guss case:
"Congress is free to change the situation at will."4 6 About the only
logical thing that Congress could do would be to reduce the swelling in
the now bulging "no man's land" area by amending section 10(a) to
empower state court agencies to act when the board declines jurisdiction.
We do not believe this is feasible or practical.
There are only fourteen states, including two territories, that now have
full-fledged labor relation acts.47 It is clear that the proviso in section
10(a) refers to cession agreements made by the NLRB to agencies of
states or territories. Labor board agencies do not exist in states which
do not have labor relations acts. The majority of the states do not have
45. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
46. 353 U.S. at 11.
47. 4 CCH Lab. L. Rep. (4th ed.) fI 40,355 (1957).
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such acts, therefore, those same states do not have agencies to which
cession agreements could be made now under section 10(a) as it exists,
or under any potential amendments thereof. To whom, or to what
bodies, in such instances could the cession agreements be made? The
only answer would be to the courts in the absence of agencies. Courts
differ in their opinions in the law of labor relations, not only from state
to state, but from county to county. In light of this judicial difference
of opinion, need we argue how maladroit the procedure could become if
cession agreements were to be seriously considered under section 10(a)
or any amendment thereof? It is obvious that proper administration
in the field of labor relations requires uniformity if section 10(a), or
any amendment thereunder is to be activated.
The Ives bill" points up the objections. In this bill, Senator Ives
seeks to clarify the authority of the states. In part it reads as follows:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to bar any agency, or
the courts of any state or territory, from assuming and asserting juris-
diction over labor disputes over which the board declines . . . to assert
jurisdiction ... "
Is it not obvious that labor disputes should not be distributed to the
courts in the first instance? The multiplicity of court decisions would
produce an inevitable contrariety, which, in turn, would compound con-
fusion in the labor management relations field. This situation produced
by any amendment of section 10(a) could easily dwarf the present
dilemma.
We are in the throes of an interdependent economy. Labor law is
tied to that economy, and, therefore, it touches every segment of Amer-
ican life. Our economy is always restless and ever-changing, and, there-
fore, the law itself cannot remain static. We should not, however, delib-
erately ask for confusion in this all-important field. Uniformity of
approach, both administratively and decisionally should be sought after
in the field of labor relations, or any other field for that matter, which
pervades not part but all of our economy. Diffusion of that authority
through the amendment of section 10(a) would not seem to be the
solution. The only logical answer to the notion that states should take
over if the NLRB refuses to act, would be for all of the states, not just
fourteen of them, to enact a uniform labor relations act, with state
boards to administer the law, which would not, of course, be repugnant
to the federal act. This would, of course, be a solution, but it is not likely
to occur. As a matter of fact, the chances of any multiple state legisla-
tive action at this writing look dim.
As we have seen, the NLRB now has the power to exercise its broad
pre-enfptive jurisdiction uniformly. Therefore, if the provisions of the
48. S. 1772, 85th Congress, 2d Sess. (1958).
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NLRA are to be administered and enforced without further confusion
or even disastrous results to our economy, the necessary budgetary
appropriations should be seriously considered for the purpose of aug-
menting not only the Board's facilities, but its personnel. Since the
writing of this article, as bearing upon our theory of this approach, the
NLRB has already adopted new standards for the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion. These new standards expand the scope of the Board's activities. 49
We do not say this is the only way, but really is there any other
way without the attendant possibility of injuring our economy,
social interests and business cycles to all of which labor law is linked?
What the results will be with reference to the problem posed by the
application of any remedy perhaps cannot now be seen in proper per-
spective, because we are so close to the problem. The success or failure
of the application of remedies, legislative or otherwise, to issues which
are national in scope, can only be seen, as well as understood, when those
issues take their rightful place in the stream of history.
49. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. (4th ed.) f[ 50,086, 50,092 (1958). These new standards became
effective September 1, 1958. They revise somewhat the proposals set forth in the July
announcement; under each statement appears, in parenthesis, the 1954 standard: 1. Non-
retail: $50,000 outflow and inflow, direct or indirecta (1954-$50,000 outflow, $500,000
inflow, $100,000 indirect outflow, $1 million indirect inflow.) 2. Office Buildings: Gross
Revenue of $100,000 of which $25,000 or more is derived from organizations which meet
any of the new standards. (1954-Employer who leases or owns and who operates must
be otherwise in commerce and utilize building primarily to house its own offices.) 3. Retail
concerns: $500,000 gross volume of business. (1954-Direct inflow of $1,000,000, or indirect
inflow of $2,000,000 or direct outflow of $100,000.) 4. Instrumentalities, links, and channels
of interstate commerce: $50,000 from interstate (or linkage) part of enterprise, or from
services performed for employers in commerce. (1954-$100,000.) 5. Public utilities:
$250,000 gross volume, or meet standard 1 (non-retail). (1954-$3,000,000 gross volume.)
6. Transit systems:b $250,000 gross volume. (1954-$3,000,000 gross volume.) 7. News-
papers and communication systems: Radio, television, telegraph and telephone: $100,000
gross volume. Newspapers: $200,000 gross volume. (1954-$500,000 test for newspapers,
$200,000 for the others.) 8. National defense: Substantial impact on national defense.
(1954-$100000 in goods or services directly related to national defense, and pursuant to
government contract.) 9. Business in the Territories and District of Columbia: D.C.,
Plenary; Territories, Standards apply. (Same as 1954.) 10. Associations: Regarded as
single employer. (Same as 1954.)
a Direct outflow refers to goods shipped or services furnished by the employer outside
the state. Indirect outflow includes sales within the state to users meeting any standard
except solely an indirect inflow or indirect outflow standard. Direct inflow refers to goods
or services furnished directly to the employer from outside the state in which the employer
is located. Indirect inflow refers to the purchase of goods or services which originated
outside the employer's state but which he purchased from a seller within the state. Direct
and indirect outflow may be combined and direct and indirect inflow may also be com-
bined to meet the $50,000 requirement. However, outflow and inflow may not be combined.
b Except taxicabs, as to which the retail ($500,000 gross volume of business) test shall
apply.
